[MCNetwork]

It's smart that CAN decided to retrench and cut back on new fundings so they can determine how their lending portfolio is really doing. Too many funders are concerned with funding as much as possible. The problem is that rapid growth conceals problems. We saw this happen with credit card companies over a decade ago. They experienced hyper growth through aggressive mailings and generous balance transfer programs. After a few years of stellar growth, they cut back on their mailers and this allowed their bad debt to catch up with them and bite them in the ass. Now credit card companies are a lot more selective with customer acquisition.

New accounts take time to build up a payment history, become delinquent, and go to writeoff, and the volume of newer current receivables helps to conceal the true rate of writeoff. To further complicate matters, far too many accounts that normally should be written off or cut off from further funding keep being renewed or are put on a ridiculously low "payment plan" to remain a "good" and active account. This just prolongs their inevitable demise and funders end up throwing good money after bad to make the books look good. I think after CAN gets a good grasp on delinquent accounts and writeoffs, they'll be able to tighten their underwriting standards and get back on track. You probably won't see any more hyper aggressive rates and long terms coming from them though. Too many funders are now realizing that low rates/lengthy terms in this uncollateralized space carries far too much risk for the reward and is not a sustainable business model. I think you'll see the same thing happen to On Deck at some point.

[staten]

It's smart that CAN decided to retrench and cut back on new fundings so they can determine how their lending portfolio is really doing. Too many funders are concerned with funding as much as possible. The problem is that rapid growth conceals problems. We saw this happen with credit card companies over a decade ago. They experienced hyper growth through aggressive mailings and generous balance transfer programs. After a few years of stellar growth, they cut back on their mailers and this allowed their bad debt to catch up with them and bite them in the ass. Now credit card companies are a lot more selective with customer acquisition.

New accounts take time to build up a payment history, become delinquent, and go to writeoff, and the volume of newer current receivables helps to conceal the true rate of writeoff. To further complicate matters, far too many accounts that normally should be written off or cut off from further funding keep being renewed or are put on a ridiculously low "payment plan" to remain a "good" and active account. This just prolongs their inevitable demise and funders end up throwing good money after bad to make the books look good. I think after CAN gets a good grasp on delinquent accounts and writeoffs, they'll be able to tighten their underwriting standards and get back on track. You probably won't see any more hyper aggressive rates and long terms coming from them though. Too many funders are now realizing that low rates/lengthy terms in this uncollateralized space carries far too much risk for the reward and is not a sustainable business model. I think you'll see the same thing happen to On Deck at some point.

Yes-this is 101 how an MCA business should be run. Disagree vigorously on time. This is daily cash business. Payments are for the most part fixed. You know $ you should be getting in. You look at your bank accounts to see what you received. The difference is what takes up 90% of the your day when you run a large MCA company. It's called work.